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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
NO. 99-3865 
 
HORSEHEAD INDUSTRIES, INC., 
 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:CV-94-0298) 
District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 25, 2000 
 
Before: BARRY, AMBRO and GREENBERG, 
Circuit Judges* 
 
(Filed July 17, 2001) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
*This matter was argued on June 22, 2000 befor e the panel of the 
Honorable Maryanne Trump Barry and Morton I. Greenberg, Circuit 
Judges, and the Honorable Louis F. Ober dorfer, Senior United States 
District Judge for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation. The 
case was reassigned on June 30, 2000 to the above panel due to the 
recusal of Judge Oberdorfer. 
  
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue presented in this appeal is whether a state 
court judgment, which requires Horsehead Industries, Inc. 
("Horsehead") contractually to indemnify Paramount 
Communications, Inc. ("Paramount") for all environmental 
costs arising from Horsehead's purchase of certain 
Paramount operations, subsequently can be used by 
Paramount collaterally to estop Horsehead's federal 
CERCLA contribution claim. As a threshold matter, we 
conclude that, under New York law, the state court 
declaratory judgment requiring Horsehead to indemnify 
Paramount is sufficiently final to be given pr eclusive effect, 
despite the fact that damages have yet to be decided. 
Applying New York's principles of collateral estoppel, we 
find that the scope of the indemnity provision is sufficiently 
broad to encompass the identical issues in the federal 
CERCLA contribution case, and that the parties had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue befor e the New 
York courts. We therefore affirm the decision of the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
("District Court") granting preclusive ef fect to the judgment 
of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division. 
 
I. Background 
 
At the heart of this appeal is the interplay between two 
sources of liability for the cost to remedy environmental 
damage -- a contractual indemnification pr ovision and 
statutory liability under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
("CERCLA"), found at 42 U.S.C. SS 9601-9627, 9651-9675, 
6911a; and 26 U.S.C. SS 4611-12, 4661-62. W ith respect to 
the former, parties to a contract can indemnify each other 
for the costs stemming from environmental liabilities, and 
those clauses will be interpreted under traditional contract 
law principles. Where sufficient consideration exists -- 
either as a benefit to the promisor, or a detriment to the 
promisee -- the indemnification clause is enforceable. See 
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Holt v. Feigenbaum, 419 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y. 1981) (holding 
that a written promise to indemnify co-shar eholders against 
disproportionate loss was supported by legally sufficient 
consideration and therefore was enfor ceable). 
 
Parties may also be statutorily liable to the federal 
Government for cleanup costs under CERCLA, a 
determination made in a suit filed by the Government 
against potentially responsible parties. The purpose of 
CERCLA is "to assure that the current and future costs 
associated with hazardous waste facilities, including post- 
closure costs, will be adequately financed and, to the 
greatest extent possible, borne by the owners and operators 
of such facilities." See 42 U.S.C. S 9607; OHM Remediation 
Services v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., 116 F .3d 1574 (5th 
Cir. 1997) (noting CERCLA's broad, r emedial purpose to 
facilitate prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to 
shift costs of environmental response fr om taxpayers to 
parties who benefitted from wastes that caused harm). To 
effect this purpose, Congress cast the liability net wide to 
capture all potentially responsible parties.1 
 
Under CERCLA, if a purchaser were found liable for 
cleanup costs, it could then seek cost recovery or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 107 of CERCLA creates four categories of potentially 
responsible defendants: 
 
       1. The current owner and operator of a vessel or facility; 
 
       2. Any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous 
       substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous 
       substances were disposed of; 
 
       3. Any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged 
       for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for 
       transport for disposal or treatment, of hazar dous substances owned 
       or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any 
       facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party 
or 
       entity and containing such hazardous substances; 
 
       4. Any person who accepts or accepted any hazar dous substances 
       for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration 
vessels 
       or sites selected by such person. 
 
Frank B. Cross, Federal Environmental Regulation of Real Estate, P 2.03 
(1993) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. S 9607(a)(1)-(4). 
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contribution from the seller absent an indemnification 
agreement to the contrary. See Nicholas A. Robinson, 
Environmental Regulation of Real PropertyS 22.03[2] 
(1998). Where such an indemnity agreement was entered 
into, contractual and statutory liability for r emediation co- 
exist. In this context, CERCLA recognizes the parties' right 
contractually to indemnify each other, although S 107(e)(1) 
does not permit the transfer of statutory liability vis a vis 
the Government: 
 
       No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar 
       agreement or conveyance shall be effective to transfer 
       from the owner or operator of any vessel or facility or 
       from any person who may be liable for a r elease or 
       threat of release under this section, to any other 
       person the liability under this section. Nothing in this 
       subsection shall bar any agreement to insur e, hold 
       harmless, or indemnify a party to such agr eement for 
       any liability under this section. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 9607(e)(1). While the parties r emain jointly and 
severally liable for cleanup responsibility, the statute 
permits, inter alia, the allocation of the costs for cleanup 
via indemnification agreements. See SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., v. Rohm and Haas Co., et al., 89 F .3d 154, 158 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (citing Beazer East, Inc., v. Mead Corp., 34 F.3d 
206, 211 (3d Cir. 1994)). Of course, "statutory liability 
under CERCLA endures even if contractual liability is later 
determined to be non-existent." GNB Battery Technologies, 
Inc., v. Gould, Inc., 65 F.3d 615, 621 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 
In this appeal, the contractual liability and statutory 
liability for the remediation of environmental damage are 
allegedly in conflict because the New York state courts 
determined the contractual liability, including CERCLA 
contribution claims, to flow one way -- to Horsehead -- 
while the statutory liability is joint and several. 
 
II. Factual and Procedural History 
 
With this background, we turn to the facts before us.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A thorough history is presented in the New York Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division case titled Paramount Communications, Inc. v. 
Horsehead Industries, Inc., 660 N.Y.S.2d 718 (App. Div. 1997). It is this 
state court judgment that Paramount used collaterally to estop 
Horsehead's CERCLA contribution claim in the District Court. 
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Since the late 19th century, the New Jersey Zinc Company 
("NJZ") conducted zinc ore smelting operations in the 
vicinity of Palmerton, Pennsylvania.3 These smelting 
operations did not employ air emissions contr ol equipment 
or devices to prevent the leaching of hazar dous wastes into 
the soil, groundwater or watercourses."As a result, the 
areas in which the smelting took place suf fered drastic on- 
site and off-site contamination and degradation, including 
the formation of slag heaps permeated with heavy metals, 
known as `cinder banks', which, at Palmerton alone, 
contained approximately 30 million tons of r esidue." 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Horsehead Industries, 
Inc., 660 N.Y.S.2d 718, 719 (App. Div. 1997). 
 
In the late 1970s, Gulf and Western Industries, Inc. 
(G&W), Paramount's predecessor in inter est, purchased 
NJZ. Shortly thereafter, Congress passed CERCLA. As a 
result, "the cinder banks became a r egulatory concern 
because heavy metals were leaching into the soil and into 
nearby waterways." Id. The financial consequences of 
remediation were steep. For example, estimates for the 
encapsulation of the Palmerton cinder banks in cement to 
prevent further discharge exceeded $50,000,000. Although 
G&W permanently closed the zinc smelting operations in 
December of 1980, it still performed other manufacturing 
processes at Palmerton. Because CERCLA imposes joint 
and several liability on past as well as curr ent owners or 
operators, "simply selling [NJZ's] assets would not relieve 
[G&W] of these liabilities. Consequently, G&W's preferable 
course of action was to sell a still viable operation." Id. at 
722.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. NJZ also subsequently operated zinc smelting operations in the 
vicinity of DePue, Illinois. The appeal befor e us is limited to the 
Palmerton site. 
 
4. The Court in Paramount noted that 
 
       while some regulatory compliance costs wer e immediate and 
       ongoing, CERCLA permitted the bulk of expenditures at either of the 
       sites, including Palmerton, to be postponed until NJZ closed down 
       operations at the site completely, at which point full scale, 
sitewide 
       remediation and satisfaction of statutory closure obligations would 
       be required. 
 
Paramount, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 719. 
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Because of the difficulty in arranging financing for the 
transfer of such a huge environmental liability, former 
officials of G&W's Natural Resources Division formed 
Horsehead in 1981 to purchase certain assets at the 
Palmerton site.5 The Asset Pur chase Agreement ("APA") 
between G&W and Horsehead was entered on September 
15, 1981. Given the potential environmental cleanup costs 
at Palmerton, G&W included an indemnity provision, found 
at Paragraph I.F (2) of the APA, under the heading 
"Assumption of Liabilities."6 The indemnity provision 
specifically requires Horsehead to 
 
       pay, perform and discharge only the following 
       obligations of Seller: . . . [a]ll commitments, obligations 
       and requirements imposed upon Seller by virtue of any 
       environmental, safety and health, reclamation or other 
       law, rule, regulation, action or proceeding by any 
       governmental agency and any order emanating 
       therefrom and all liabilities, damages, costs, obligations 
       and requirements imposed upon Seller by virtue of any 
       action or proceeding brought by any person, firm or 
       corporation under any environmental, safety and 
       health or reclamation law (statutory or common), rule 
       or regulation relating to the maintenance or operation 
       of the Purchased Assets or to the conduct of the 
       Seller's Business7 at any time prior to or after the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The agreement of sale transferred"all of seller's right, title and 
interest 
in and to all real property located in the County of Carbon, Pennsylvania 
[where the Palmerton facility is located], the County of Sussex, New 
Jersey and the County of Bureau, Illinois [where the DePue site is 
located] . . . ." Id. at 720. Again, this appeal is concerned with the 
transfer of assets at the Palmerton facility. 
 
6. In addition, G&W and Horsehead agreed that Horsehead would pay 
annual environmental compliance and maintenance costs of 
approximately $200,000. G&W also purchased insurance for any 
additional environmental cleanup costs. See Paramount, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 
719-20. 
7. "Seller's Business" is described in the APA as 
 
       the business of mining, manufacturing and selling zinc oxide, zinc 
       powder, zinc dust, zamak and other alloys, secondary materials, 
       special anodes, rolled zinc, copper-based and other metal powders, 
       special oxides, zinstabe, cadmium, ammonia and carbon dioxide 
       and . . . the operation of Palmer Water Company and Chestnut 
       Ridge Railway Company and, through NJZ Alloys, partnership, . . . 
       the manufacture and sale of indium metal . . . . 
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       Transfer Date including, but not limited to, those 
       matters disclosed in Schedule VIII. 
 
Schedule VIII, entitled "Defaults, Litigation, Claims, 
Environmental Matters, Etc.," contained a detailed listing of 
existing or potential legal obligations or liabilities for which 
some official action, investigation or study had already 
begun at the time of the APA, including those related to the 
discontinued operations of the metal circuits 8 purchased by 
Horsehead. See Paramount, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 720. 
 
The APA further provided that, except as identified in the 
indemnification provision, Horsehead would assume no 
other liability or obligation of the seller arising from the 
Seller's Business. See id. In addition, Subparagraphs[a]-[f] 
of Paragraph I.F(2) in the APA (directly following the 
indemnification provision) listed those contingent liabilities 
that Horsehead expressly did not assume9 and those 
particular legal or enforcement actions under which (1) 
Paramount would reimburse Horsehead, (2) the parties 
would share the costs, or (3) Horsehead would assume the 
performance and all related costs. 
 
That the parties had contemplated CERCLA liability is 
evidenced by the reference in Schedule VIII to a 
memorandum attached thereto discussing CERCLA 
reporting requirements, which stated in part: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The APA transferred, among other things, the assets comprising the 
metal circuits, which included the property, plant and equipment used 
in the production of primary zinc metal at the Palmerton facility. 
 
9. Under Subparagraph I.F(2)[d], Horsehead expressly did not assume 
certain contingent liabilities in Schedule VIII. One such contingent 
liability is found in Schedule VIII-A2(a), which states: 
 
       Because applicable law gives administrative agencies discretion to 
       bring enforcement actions against closed facilities, and because 
the 
       U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") was, at the time of 
       closing the primary zinc metal circuit at Palmerton, threatening to 
       bring such an action against Seller to recover civil penalties for 
past 
       alleged violations of applicable air-pollution control laws 
(primarily 
       in respect of sulfur-oxide and particulate emissions), Seller 
       recognizes this state of fact as repr esenting a contingent 
liability. 
       . . . 
 
                                7 
  
       "The Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
       Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601 et 
       seq., commonly known as the `Superfund' legislation, 
       requires reporting of all unper mitted releases into the 
       environment of hazardous substances fr om facilities 
       (42 U.S.C. 9603[a]), and requires pr esent and past 
       owners to report existing and abandoned hazar dous 
       waste disposal facilities that do not have appr oval or 
       interim status under [the Resource Conservation and 
       Recovery Act] (42 U.S.C. 9603[c]). `Superfund' also 
       establishes funding for cleanup of existing hazar dous 
       waste facilities, imposes liability for hazar dous waste 
       spills, and sets financial responsibility r equirements for 
       operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage and 
       disposal facilities (42 U.S.C. 9607, 9611). 
 
       "If a hazardous waste site is subject to`Superfund', the 
       obligation to report hazardous waste sites survives the 
       transfer of the site. Both present and past pr operty 
       owners who disposed of hazardous waste must r eport 
       the existence of the site. 42 U.S.C. 9603(c). The former 
       owner may be liable for cleanup and disposal costs 
       under 42 U.S.C. 9607(a). The former owner may not 
       use an indemnification agreement to shift liability to any 
       other person, but may obtain insurance against his own 
       liability." 
 
Paramount, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 721 (quoting Memorandum 
dated September 22, 1981, attached to and made a part of 
the APA) (emphasis added in opinion). 
 
On September 8, 1983, the United States Envir onmental 
Protection Agency (the "EPA"), after an investigation begun 
in 1979, listed Palmerton on the CERCLA National Priority 
List. Since then, Horsehead claims to have incurr ed 
significant costs from studies and remediation of the 
environmental conditions at Palmerton. In September, 
1985, Horsehead entered into an Administrative Order by 
Consent (the "Consent Order") with the EP A wherein 
Horsehead agreed to fund a Remedial Investigation and 
Feasibility Study of the Palmerton site. In September, 1987, 
the EPA issued a Record of Decision ("ROD") for the Blue 
Mountain Operable Unit,10 which, according to the EPA, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Operable Unit 1 is an area of Blue Mountain located south of 
Horsehead's East Plant at Palmerton. 
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was denuded of vegetation as a result of years of smelting 
operations. Horsehead agreed to design and fund the re- 
vegetation of a portion of the Mountain. In June, 1988, 
after EPA issued a ROD for the Cinder Bank Operable Unit,11 
Horsehead agreed to perform five additional studies to 
identify alternate response actions. On February 11, 1992, 
in a second amendment to the Consent Order , Horsehead 
agreed to undertake additional response actions related to 
the removal of lead from homes in Palmerton. Id. at 11-12. 
 
Litigation of statutory liability under CERCLA began with 
regard to the Palmerton site in 1992, when the United 
States filed an action against Horsehead Resour ce 
Development Company, Inc.12 and Horsehead alleging 
violation of certain environmental laws. United States v. 
Horsehead Resource Dev. Co., et al., 92-CV -0008.13 On 
October 8, 1993, Horsehead filed a motion for leave to file 
a third-party complaint against Paramount to r ecover its 
remediation costs. Horsehead's motion to file its third-party 
complaint was subsequently denied. 
 
In light of the Government's CERCLA action, and 
pursuant to a choice of law clause in the AP A, Paramount 
filed a contract action for damages and for declaratory 
judgment in the Supreme Court of New York, Trial Division, 
on October 14, 1993, seeking an interpretation of the 
contractual indemnification provision as it applied to 
environmental claims. The New York trial court ruled on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The Cinder Bank Operable Unit (Operable Unit 2) consists of more 
than 30,000,000 tons of smelter residue deposited along the base of Blue 
Mountain. The cinder bank is approximately 2 miles long, 500 to 1,000 
feet wide, and 100 to 200 feet high. The remaining Operable Units have 
been designated by the EPA as Operable Unit 3, consisting of the surface 
soils in the Palmerton area, and Operable Unit 4, consisting of the 
groundwater in the same area. 
 
12. Horsehead Resource Development Company, Inc. ("HRDC") is a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Horsehead Industries, Inc. 
 
13. Ultimately, the EPA's suit was settled by consent decree with 
Horsehead and HRDC. Subsequently, on April 17, 1998, the United 
States filed a CERCLA liability and cost r ecovery action in the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania against Horsehead, HRDC, Paramount and 
nearly 200 other parties. See United States v. Horsehead Industries, Inc., 
et al., No. 3:CV 98-0654. 
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April 24, 1996 that the contractual indemnification 
provision obligated Horsehead to indemnify Paramount for 
certain environmental costs, but did not transfer CERCLA 
liability costs. 
 
Both parties appealed the New York trial court decision, 
and on July 10, 1997 the New York Supr eme Court, 
Appellate Division, agreed with the Trial Division's ruling 
that as a matter of law Horsehead is requir ed to indemnify 
Paramount pursuant to the indemnification pr ovision for 
certain environmental costs. But unlike the T rial Division, 
the Appellate Division held that the indemnification 
provision included those remediation costs that Horsehead 
is currently seeking under CERCLA. The Appellate Division 
refused re-argument and refused to grant Horsehead leave 
to appeal. Horsehead then filed a motion for leave to appeal 
directly in the New York Court of Appeals. The motion was 
dismissed on the ground that the order of the Appellate 
Division did not finally determine the action. Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. Horsehead Industries Inc.,  691 
N.E.2d 634 (Table, December 22, 1997). 
 
Notwithstanding the New York state court action, 
Horsehead filed a complaint in the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania on Mar ch 1, 
1994 against Paramount for contribution under S 113(f) of 
CERCLA, which provides that "[a]ny person may seek 
contribution from any other person who is liable or 
potentially liable . . . . In resolving contribution claims, the 
court may allocate response costs among liable parties 
using such equitable factors as the court deter mines are 
appropriate." 42 U.S.C. S 9613(f). The amended complaint 
included four counts. Counts I and II sought r ecovery from 
Paramount pursuant to S 107(a)(4) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 
S 9607(a)(4). Count III sought contribution fr om Paramount 
under S 113(f) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. S 9613(f). Count IV 
sought cost recovery and also alleged public nuisance 
under the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act 
("HSCA"), 35 Pa. C.S.A. SS 6020.101-1305. Paramount 
moved for summary judgment on June 4, 1999, asking that 
the District Court, as an affirmative defense to Horsehead's 
claims, give full faith and credit to the decision of the New 
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division. The District Court 
 
                                10 
  
did so, and entered summary judgment in Paramount's 
favor on October 21, 1999. This appeal followed. 
 
Jurisdiction was proper in the District Court under 42 
U.S.C. S 9613(b), which vests exclusive jurisdiction of 
CERCLA claims in the federal courts, and under 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1331 and 1367. Appellate jurisdiction is proper in this 
Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
III. Legal Analysis 
 
As noted at the outset of this opinion, we must decide 
whether the District Court properly invoked New York's 
collateral estoppel law to give preclusive ef fect to the state 
court judgment rendering Horsehead contractually liable for 
the costs stemming from environmental damage at the 
Palmerton site, including CERCLA claims. If so, Horsehead 
may not proceed on its CERCLA contribution claim against 
Paramount in the District Court. 
 
We review the District Court's entry of summary 
judgment de novo. See Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 
768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994). We also r eview the District Court's 
interpretation, application, and prediction of state law de 
novo. See InfoComp, Inc. v. Electra Pr oducts, Inc., 109 F.3d 
902, 905 (3d Cir. 1997). Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure "mandates the entry of summary judgment, 
after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against 
a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish 
the existence of an element essential to that party's case, 
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 
trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 
"Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a 
rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there 
is no `genuine issue for trial.' " Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing First 
National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 
289 (1968)). We recognize that when considering a motion 
for summary judgment, all evidence submitted must be 
viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 
 
A. Collateral Estoppel Under New York Law 
 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that "once a 
court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its 
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judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the 
issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a 
party to the first case." Allen v. McCurry , 449 U.S. 90, 94 
(1980). By federal statute, "judicial proceedings . . . shall 
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the 
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they 
have by law or usage in the courts of such State . .. ." 28 
U.S.C. S 1738. 
 
The parties agree that New York law governs this issue. 
"In adjudicating a case under state law, we ar e not free to 
impose our own view of what state law should be; rather, 
we are to apply existing state law as interpr eted by the 
state's highest court in an effort to pr edict how that court 
would decide the precise legal issues befor e us." Koppers 
Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1445 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (citing Kowalsky v. Long Beach Township, 72 
F.3d 385, 388 (3d Cir. 1995)). Given that we are faced with 
an absence of guidance from New York's highest court, we 
must look to decisions of state intermediate appellate 
courts and of federal courts interpreting New Y ork law. Id. 
Neither party disputes that 28 U.S.C. S 1738 r equires 
federal courts, in cases where state law applies, to give 
preclusive effect to state court judgments whenever courts 
of the state from which the judgment emanated would do 
so. What the parties dispute is whether the state court 
judgment in this case meets the New York collateral 
estoppel test such that the District Court can give it 
preclusive effect as a matter of law. 
 
The District Court cited to Hickerson v. City of New York, 
146 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1998), for New Y ork's collateral 
estoppel principles. Although a federal court decision, 
Hickerson explained and applied New York collateral 
estoppel law, stating that "an issue may not be r elitigated 
if the identical issue was necessarily decided in a previous 
proceeding, provided that the party against whom collateral 
estoppel is being asserted had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue in the prior action." 146 F .3d at 104 
(relying on In re Sokol, 113 F .3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 467 N.E.2d 487, 490-91 (N.Y. 
1984)). As to these two elements -- the identical issue and 
a full and fair opportunity to litigate -- "[t]he party seeking 
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the benefit of collateral estoppel has the bur den of 
demonstrating the identity of the issues in the pr esent 
litigation and the prior determination, wher eas the party 
attempting to defeat its application has the bur den of 
establishing the absence of a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue in the prior action." In r e Juan C. v. 
Cortines, 679 N.E.2d 1061, 1065 (N.Y. 1997) (citing 
Kaufman v. Lilly & Co., 482 N.E.2d 63, 66 (N.Y . 1985)). In 
addition to whether the issues are identical and whether a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate is affor ded, embodied in 
New York's collateral estoppel rule is the concept of finality 
of judgments, i.e., that the judgment in the prior 
proceeding, and on which the claim to collateral estoppel is 
based, is final. See In re Juan C., 679 N.E.2d at 1063. Each 
of these principles, beginning with finality, is discussed 
below. 
 
       (1) Finality 
 
New York law incorporates the threshold concept of 
"finality" of judgments into its collateral estoppel standard.14 
The previous proceeding must result"in a final and valid 
judgment in which the party opposing estoppel had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate." See In r e Juan C., 679 
N.E.2d at 1063. However, contrary to Horsehead's 
argument, finality does not requir e that all appeals be 
completed. "The finality of a judgment for the purposes of 
appealability is not the same as its finality for collateral 
estoppel purposes." State Bank of Albany v. McAuliffe, 485 
N.Y.S.2d 139, 141 (App. Div. 1985); see also Matter of 
Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 445 N.Y.S.2d 820, 822 (App. Div. 1981) 
("The rule in New York, unlike that in other jurisdictions, is 
that the mere pendency of an appeal does not pr event the 
use of the challenged judgment as the basis of collaterally 
estopping a party to that judgment in a second 
proceeding."). Accordingly, the possibility that this 
judgment may be overturned during the pr oper course of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Of course, a prerequisite to finding finality is that the judgment 
relied upon for collateral estoppel purposes be valid. Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments S 1 (1982). Neither party disputes the validity of 
the judgment of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division. 
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appellate review does not prohibit r esort to collateral 
estoppel. 
 
The District Court cited Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth 
Oil Refining Co., 297 F.2d 80 (2d Cir . 1962), cert. denied 
sub nom. Dawson v. Lummus Co., 368 U.S. 986 (1962), for 
the distinction between finality for purposes of appeal and 
finality for purposes of collateral estoppel. Judge Henry J. 
Friendly in Lummus was interpreting New York law when he 
stated: 
 
       Whether a judgment, not "final" in the sense of 28 
       U.S.C. S 1291, ought nevertheless be consider ed "final" 
       in the sense of precluding further litigation of the same 
       issue, turns upon such factors as the natur e of the 
       decision (i.e., that it was not avowedly tentative), the 
       adequacy of the hearing, and the opportunity for 
       review. "Finality" in the context her e relevant may 
       mean little more than that the litigation of a particular 
       issue has reached such a stage that a court sees no 
       really good reason for permitting it to be litigated 
       again. 
 
297 F.2d at 89 (internal citations omitted); accord, Sherman 
v. Jacobson, 247 F. Supp. 261, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (" `final' 
in the res judicata or collateral estoppel sense is not 
identical to `final' in the rule governing the jurisdiction of 
appellate courts"). In Sherman, as in this case, the decision 
on which collateral estoppel rested remained open for 
appeal. Significantly, as the District Court in our case 
pointed out, the court in Sherman concluded that a 
judgment may be final as to some matters, even though the 
litigation continues as to others, and "the decision may 
have adjudicated liability only, leaving the assessment of 
damages in abeyance." Sherman, 247 F. Supp. at 268; see 
also Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div. , 327 
F.2d 944, 955 (2d Cir. 1964) ("The mere fact that the 
damages of the Zdanok plaintiffs have not yet been 
assessed should not deprive that ruling of any ef fect as 
collateral estoppel it would otherwise have."), cert. denied, 
377 U.S. 934 (1964). 
 
The District Court noted that while the New Y ork 
approach outlined in Lummus departs fr om the traditional 
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view of finality, it continues to garner support. See 
Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 366 (2d Cir. 1992) 
("The mere fact that the damages awar ded to the plaintiff 
have not been yet calculated, though normally precluding 
an immediate appeal, . . . does not prevent use of a final 
ruling on liability as collateral estoppel."); In re Brown, 951 
F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir. 1991) ("In this case, the order of the 
state court granting summary judgment on liability was not 
final for purposes of appeal, but that does not deny it 
preclusive effect in the bankruptcy court."); Hennessy v. 
Cement and Concrete Worker's Union, 963 F. Supp. 334, 
339 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("The fact that Hennessy could have 
appealed the order but chose to await a decision on the 
damages on the counterclaim before appealing from the 
dismissal of his claim does not change the conclusive effect 
of the final disposition of the claim."). 
 
Applying the factors that Judge Friendly consider ed 
relevant, e.g., the nature of the decision, the adequacy of 
the hearing, and the opportunity for review, the District 
Court found that the New York indemnification order was 
sufficiently final. We agree. Horsehead fully litigated the 
indemnification agreement before both the New York trial 
court and the intermediate appellate court. Thus, the 
hearing and opportunity for review affor ded Horsehead were 
adequate. The decision rendered by the New York Supreme 
Court, Appellate Division, is binding on the T rial Division. 
Although not final for purposes of an appeal to the New 
York Court of Appeals given that damages r emain to be 
litigated, the nature of the New York Appellate Division 
decision as to liability is in no way tentative. Therefore, we 
conclude that, for purposes of collateral estoppel, the 
decision is final. 
 
       (2) Identical Issues 
 
Under New York law, the burden r ests on Paramount to 
demonstrate that the issues litigated in the separate 
proceedings were identical. See Ryan,  467 N.E.2d at 490. 
For an issue to be identical, "it must be the point actually 
to be determined in the second action or pr oceeding such 
that `a different judgment in the second would destroy or 
impair rights or interests established by thefirst.' " Id. The 
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issue in the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 
proceeding was whether Paramount was entitled to 
indemnification for liability for certain envir onmental claims 
pursuant to its indemnification agreement with Horsehead. 
The state appellate court made an express finding that the 
indemnification provision included CERCLA contribution 
claims. See Paramount, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 723. The threshold 
issue in the District Court proceeding seeking contribution 
from Paramount for response costs under CERCLA is 
whether the scope of the indemnification pr ovision covers 
CERCLA liability costs. If it does, then the issue in the state 
contract and federal CERCLA contribution proceedings is, 
for our purposes, identical. 
 
Courts that have considered the issue r ecognize that "the 
questions of CERCLA liability and the interpr etation of any 
indemnification agreement among the parties liable for the 
clean-up are inextricably related." GNB Battery 
Technologies, Inc. v. Gould, Inc., 65 F .3d 615, 621 (7th Cir 
1995) (citing Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal 
Co., 14 F.3d 321 (7th Cir. 1994)). Moreover, in the context 
of asset purchase or transfer agreements, courts (including 
this Court) have held that CERCLA claims are subsumed 
within broad contractual indemnification pr ovisions. See, 
e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Rohm and Haas Co., et 
al., 89 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that the 
language in the Purchase Agreement indemnity provisions 
is general enough to evidence the parties' intent to include 
CERCLA response costs, even though not specifically 
enumerated); GNB Battery Technologies, 65 F.3d at 622 
(concluding that the plain language of the assumption 
agreement was sufficiently broad to encompass any 
CERCLA liabilities that may arise, even though no specific 
reference to CERCLA was made); Beazer East, Inc. v. Mead 
Corp., 34 F.3d 206, 211 (3d Cir. 1994) ("we must look to see 
whether an indemnification provision is either specific 
enough to include CERCLA liability or general enough to 
include any and all environmental liability which would, 
naturally, include subsequent CERCLA claims"). Applying 
New York law to indemnity and release pr ovisions, courts 
have reached similar conclusions. See Olin Corp. v. 
Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 5 F.3d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(concluding that an agreement transferring"all liability" 
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transfers responsibility for all CERCLA liability, even if it 
does not expressly reference CERCLA); see also Purolator 
Prods. Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 124, 130 
(W.D.N.Y. 1991) (concluding that, under two broad 
indemnity clauses, the purchaser clearly agr eed to take the 
assets along with any liabilities, including CERCLA 
liabilities, that might attach to them). 
 
Thus, in a CERCLA contribution action where the parties 
entered into an indemnification agreement, the proper 
inquiry is whether the indemnification provision "is either 
specific enough to include CERCLA liability or general 
enough to include any and all environmental liability which 
would, naturally, include subsequent CERCLA claims." 
Beazer East, Inc., 34 F.3d at 211. The interpretation of the 
scope of the contractual indemnity provision in this case is 
guided by state law, and the parties agree that New York 
law applies. See SmithKline Beecham Corp., 89 F.3d at 158- 
59 ("We apply state law to determine whether a particular 
indemnification provision encompasses CERCLA response 
costs.") (citing Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 59 F.3d 
400, 405 (3d Cir. 1995)); Olin Corp., 5 F.3d at 15 
(concluding that federal courts should incorporate state law 
when interpreting contractual agreements allocating 
CERCLA liability). 
 
The Court in Olin summarized the relevant principles of 
New York contract law developed by the New Y ork Court of 
Appeals in Slatt v. Slatt, 477 N.E.2d 1099, 1100 (N.Y. 
1985). Under that law, "it is our function to`discern the 
intent of the parties to the extent their intent is evidenced 
by their written agreement.' " Olin, 5 F.3d at 15 (citing 
Commander Oil Corp. v. Advance Food Serv. Equip., 991 
F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Int'l Klafter Co. v. 
Continental Casualty Co., 869 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(citing Slatt, 477 N.E.2d at 1100 (N.Y . 1985)))). "Where the 
intention of the parties is clearly and unambiguously set 
forth, effect must be given to the intent as indicated by the 
language used." Slatt, 477 N.E.2d at 1100. However, we 
note that "in New York[,] indemnification agreements are 
strictly construed; a court cannot find a duty to indemnify 
absent manifestation of a `clear and unmistakable intent' to 
indemnify." Commander Oil, 991 F.2d at 51 (citing 
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Heimbach v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth. , 553 N.E.2d 242, 
246 (N.Y. 1990)). 
 
The District Court's discussion of this issue is 
unfortunately conclusory: 
 
       [R]egardless . . . whether the New Y ork action can or 
       cannot be characterized as one seeking CERCLA 
       damages, the thrust of the New York pr oceeding was 
       exclusively an action on a contract to deter mine if 
       Paramount was entitled to indemnity from [Horsehead] 
       under the contract provision dealing with 
       environmental damage claims in Palmerton, 
       Pennsylvania and elsewhere for which Paramount may 
       be liable. Accordingly, there are no factual issues over 
       environmental damages which would preclude 
       summary judgment on the indemnity question. 
 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 7. The District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Paramount, concluding that"[w]e can 
find no reason for proceeding with this second case 
between the parties when in the first case in New York 
there is a claim which was litigated and may very well moot 
this action." Id. at 10. The District Court, in reading the 
Paramount decision of the Appellate Division of the New 
York Supreme Court, was satisfied that the indemnification 
provision encompassed all of the environmental claims, 
including the CERCLA contribution claims befor e it, such 
that the identical issue was present to pr eclude litigating 
the CERCLA contribution claim in the District Court. 
 
The indemnification provision in this case is considerably 
broad, holding Horsehead responsible for the costs 
associated with all environmental liabilities stemming from 
"Seller's Business" and the "Purchased Assets" at the 
Palmerton site. Specifically, Horsehead must indemnify 
Paramount for "all liabilities, damages, costs, obligations 
and requirements . . . under any envir onmental, safety and 
health or reclamation law." The indemnification provision 
applies to "the maintenance or operation of the Purchased 
Assets or to the conduct of the Seller's Business at any 
time prior to or after the Transfer Date." 
 
This provision shows a clear and unmistakable intent to 
include all environmental claims, including claims for 
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contribution under CERCLA. The circumstances 
surrounding the transfer of assets, most notably that 
Horsehead was formed by officials of Paramount's 
predecessor for the purpose of transferring the 
environmental liability associated with the Palmerton site, 
id. at 719, confirm that intent. W e agree with the New York 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, which made a thorough 
inquiry as to the scope of the indemnification pr ovision, 
that "[t]he language of the broad indemnification clause 
itself clearly and unambiguously requir es indemnification 
for all liabilities arising from environmental laws and 
regulations, without any exclusion of CERCLA liabilities." 
Id. at 722. 
 
However, the indemnification provision was accompanied 
by contractual limitations on Horsehead's liability. 
Horsehead argues that these limitations, notably the 
exceptions enumerated under Subparagraphs I.F(2)[a]-[f] of 
the APA and Schedule VIII appended to it, defeat the 
identicality between contractual liability and CERCLA 
liability. Contractually, Horsehead would not be r esponsible 
for certain contingent liabilities it expressly declined. See 
supra, note 9. Yet under CERCLA's statutory liability, 
Horsehead posits that it may be responsible for those same 
contingent liabilities. Horsehead contends that the District 
Court's decision in this case sidesteps CERCLA's 
contribution mechanism and requires Horsehead to 
reimburse Paramount for all CERCLA claims, even those 
expressly excepted in the APA and those associated with 
the assets not purchased by Horsehead. In other words, 
Horsehead argues that the universe of CERCLA liabilities 
may exceed those liabilities for which Horsehead must 
reimburse Paramount under the indemnification 
agreement, and thus the requisite identicality of issues is 
missing. 
 
Where an indemnification agreement exists, the threshold 
inquiry in a CERCLA contribution case is the same as the 
inquiry the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 
undertook: whether the scope of the indemnification 
provision is broad enough to encompass liability for 
CERCLA response costs. With respect to Horsehead's 
arguments, we first note that Horsehead is confusing the 
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determination of CERCLA liability with the function of an 
indemnification agreement, which covers the allocation of 
cleanup costs among its parties. Similar to an insurance 
policy, the indemnification agreement transfers the 
responsibility for who pays the response costs regardless of 
liability. Moreover, CERCLA recognizes the parties' right to 
indemnify each other by agreement for r esponse costs, as 
they have done. See SmithKline Beecham Corp., 89 F.3d at 
158 ("Thus responsible parties can lawfully allocate 
CERCLA response costs among themselves while r emaining 
jointly and severally liable to the government for the entire 
clean-up."). 
 
We have also reviewed the limitations on Horsehead's 
liability in Subparagraphs I.F(2)[a]-[f] of the APA and 
Schedule VIII attached thereto, and find nothing that 
changes the intent of the parties or renders the 
indemnification provision ambiguous such that it would not 
include CERCLA response costs. In GNB Battery 
Technologies, a case with relevant similarities, the Seventh 
Circuit held that the plain language of the assumption 
agreement unambiguously transferred all of seller's 
liabilities, including CERCLA liabilities, despite the fact that 
specific exemptions from liability wer e enumerated. 65 F.3d 
at 623. The Court concluded that "[t]he enumeration of 
these exemptions indicates that the parties intended to 
exempt only the situations that they specifically itemized." 
Id. Therefore, because CERCLA liabilities specifically were 
not itemized as exemptions, they were intended to be 
included by the parties. Moreover, the fact that the 
exemptions existed did not operate to defeat the inclusion 
of CERCLA liabilities. 
 
In this case, Horsehead argues that the CERCLA 
liabilities and the exceptions listed in Schedule VIII overlap. 
Under Subparagraphs I.F(2)[a], [b],[c], and [e] of the APA, 
Horsehead assumes the full performance and costs 
associated with specific litigation or consent or ders except 
where Paramount agrees to reimburse Horsehead for some 
portion of those costs. In Subparagraph I.F(2)[d], Horsehead 
expressly declines any contingent liability associated with 
certain fugitive emissions at the Palmerton site. In 
Subparagraph I.F(2)[f], Horsehead declines liability from an 
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industrial accident not related to the Palmerton site. These 
limitations on liability will likely be consider ed in the 
damages phase of the New York litigation. However, they do 
not alter our holding here that the plain language of the 
APA demonstrates the intent that Horsehead indemnify 
Paramount for all environmental claims, including claims 
for contribution under CERCLA. 
 
Moreover, that these exceptions to Horsehead's liability 
do not specifically mention CERCLA liability supports the 
view that the parties intended that CERCLA liability be 
included within the broad scope of envir onmental claims for 
which indemnification exists. As the New Y ork appellate 
court noted, "the parties' failure to include CERCLA 
liability, by name, does not render the agr eement 
ambiguous where the broad language of the agreement 
clearly encompasses all environmental liabilities of which 
CERCLA is one. More significant is the fact that CERCLA 
liability is not listed in [Subparagraphs] I.F(2)[a]-[f], which 
delineates certain limitations on the liabilities that were 
otherwise assumed by Horsehead . . . ." Paramount, 660 
N.Y.S.2d at 723. 
 
Further support for this view comes from the other side 
of the same coin. That the parties to the AP A knew well of 
CERCLA, and thus could have dealt with it by name in the 
APA, is made clear by the memorandum attached to 
Schedule VIII specifically mentioning CERCLA. While the 
Trial Division of the New York Supr eme Court found the 
language in the memorandum mentioning CERCLA, and 
declaring that "[t]he former owner may not use an 
indemnification agreement to shift liability to any other 
person, but may obtain insurance against his own liability," 
to create an ambiguity as to the parties' intent to include 
CERCLA costs within the broad indemnity pr ovision, the 
Appellate Division disagreed. "[The memorandum] merely 
makes a correct statement of the applicable law, as set 
forth in the statute. . . . Thus, this sentence[quoted in this 
paragraph, above] does not conflict with, or override, the 
clearly delineated obligations set forth in the 
indemnification clause, to which Horsehead agr eed." Id. at 
722-723. 
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In sum, we are satisfied that the broad indemnification 
provision here includes CERCLA contribution claims. 
Therefore, for collateral estoppel purposes the issue 
litigated in the New York state courts is identical to the 
issue that was before the District Court. For the District 
Court to have concluded otherwise would thwart 
Paramount's right to indemnification for CERCLA costs 
established in the first action in the New Y ork state courts. 
 
       (3) Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate 
 
Under New York law, the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
applies to preclude relitigation of an issue where it is found 
that the litigant against whom preclusion is sought in the 
current proceeding had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
the issue in the prior proceeding. See Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 
N.Y.2d 285, 291 (1981). "The party attempting to defeat the 
application of collateral estoppel has the bur den of 
establishing the absence of a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue in the prior action." In r e Juan C. v. 
Cortines, 679 N.E.2d 1061, 1065 (N.Y. 1997). 
 
As already noted, Horsehead has fully litigated the 
interpretation of the indemnity clause in the New York trial 
and appellate courts. Even though this judgment may later 
be overturned during the proper course of appellate review 
of damages, New York law does not prohibit the application 
of collateral estoppel. While we acknowledge that the courts 
of New York have refused to give pr eclusive effect to an 
interlocutory order, see, e.g., Morley v. Quinones, 208 
A.D.2d 813 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), this line of decisions did 
not confront the situation where the or der was reviewed by 
at least one appellate court. The case befor e us more 
closely resembles a pending appeal wher e finality can be 
found than an interlocutory order in which the parties had 
no opportunity to file an appeal. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that all three r equisite elements 
of New York collateral estoppel law exist-- finality, identical 
issues, and a full and fair opportunity to litigate-- and we 
affirm the decision of the District Court on this issue. 
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B. Rule 60(b)(5) 
 
Horsehead also argues that the District Court erred by 
proactively invoking Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure to shield its decision-making, suggesting 
that if its decision were wrong, it could easily be reopened. 
Rule 60(b)(5) provides: 
 
       On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
       may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, 
       or proceeding for the following reasons: (5) the 
       judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
       or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been 
       reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
       equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
       application. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). 
 
We agree with Horsehead that this Rule should not be 
relied on by district courts when facing difficult decisions. 
However, the District Court in this case did no such thing. 
Analyzing the case before it under New Y ork law, the 
District Court found adequate grounds to give preclusive 
effect to the New York appellate court's judgment. Its 
reference to Rule 60(b)(5) was to note that the Rule 
specifically contemplates relief wher e a judgment given 
preclusive effect was subsequently r eversed, the very 
situation complained of by Horsehead. The District Court 
did not misuse Rule 60(b)(5), and we are not persuaded by 
Horsehead's argument on this point. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated, we affirm the District Court's 
entry of summary judgment in favor of Paramount based on 
the preclusive effect of the New Y ork Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division, decision in Paramount Communications, 
Inc. v. Horsehead Industries, Inc., 660 N.Y .S.2d 718 (App. 
Div. 1997). 
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